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THE LAWS OF A NATION:
THE ESSENTIAL FORMULA FOR A LIBERAL
AND DEMOCRATIC STATE
by Yasutomo Morigiwa*

I. CONDITIONS FOR A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Yes, the "winds of change [are] swirling across the globe, restless winds of
democracy, self-determination, and openness."' The winds have brought new hope to
many who were in despair, their aspirations having been stifled by political powers that
just two years ago seemed as if they would exist for eternity.
However, we have also witnessed the hardship involved in the actual building of
a new social framework, fit for a revived or newborn aspiration to be politically free,
morally autonomous, and economically prosperous. The process has been more than
challenging, almost daunting - much more so than was foreseen or feared. It is therefore
both opportune and essential that we now take an inventory of the material that goes into
building a free society.
Another name for a free society is "a system of liberal democracy" or "a liberal
democratic state." Democracy by itself is not enough: it is only a name for a form of
government where the people, rather than an elite few, are in power. The people of a
democratic state are free to choose to be free or to be totalitarian. Therefore, democracy
needs to be animated by the spirit of liberalism, the spirit that cherishes the basic, mujual
freedom of the individual to choose a way of life. However, liberalism by itself is also
not enough for a free society to exist: it needs institutional embodiment. Both the liberal
ideal and a democratic government are needed for a free society.
We shall look into the concepts of democracy, liberalism, and the liberal
democratic state or free society in more detail, but let the above description suffice for
the moment. What then are the social and historical conditions necessary for a liberal
democratic state? According to the recent views of the political theorist, John Rawls:
[A]s a practical political matter no general moral conception can
provide a publicly recognized basis for a conception of justice in a modem
democratic state. The social and historical conditions of such a state have
their origins in the Wars of Religion following the Reformation and the
subsequent development of the principle of toleration, and in the growth of
constitutional government and the institutions of large industrial market
economies. These conditions profoundly affect the requirements of a
workable conception of political justice: such a conception must allow for
a diversity of doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed
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incommensurable, conceptions of the good affirmed by the members of
existing democratic societies.2
From this statement, we can glean the following as the social and historical
conditions necessary, if not sufficient, for a modem democracy:
(1)
the experience of the Wars of Religion following the Reformation and the
development of the principle of toleration;
(2)
the growth of constitutional government; and,
(3)
the growth of institutions of large industrial market economies.
What Rawls identifies as products of the above conditions are actually the most important
elements of a modem democracy:
(4)
a nation - a group of people who consider themselves members of the
same state;
(5)
who have diverse conceptions of the good; and,
(6)
the existence of a workable public conception of justice in the state, which
can accommodate these sometimes incommensurable views.
Let us study some of these conditions.
A. The Experience of the Wars of Religion and the Development of Toleration
On the face of what is said, it seems that any country that was not involved in the
Wars of Religion and the resulting development of toleration would seem to lack one of
the essential social and historical conditions necessary for a modem democratic state. If
so, only certain countries in Western Europe would be capable of supporting democracy.
However, because Rawls assumes that the United States is a democracy, we should not
take this statement literally. A national heritage of toleration is necessary for democracy.
The developments following the Wars of Religion are paradigmatic of the historical
conditions necessary for such a social attitude to develop.
Toleration in the political sense does not mean the magnanimous, condescending
attitude of allowing differing opinions as long as they are not too powerful or heretical.
Instead, it signifies the attitude of allowing those with whom one does not see eye to eye
to take power and govern the state of which you are a member. It signifies the open
attitude of allowing the expression and implementation of ideas in which you could never
share as a guide to living a life. Toleration here means to "allow for a diversity of
doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the
good" 3 to flourish in one's nation.
"The good" refers to a conception of a way of life that claims universal validity.
A society is free if and only if it can allow diverse ideas of the good to coexist. How can
conflicting claims to universal validity coexist in a single state? This is the fundamental
theoretical problem of liberal democracy. Because a free society is a society where diverse
and conflicting ideas of the good may coexist, liberal democracy professes that social
cohesion of a state will not and should not be brought about by the regimented adoption
of a single idea of the good, no matter how sublime and morally impeccable it may be.
Justice is the concept that coordinates conflicting and sometimes incommensurable
conceptions of the good. This relationship between universal claims was sometimes called
the problem of "the right and the good." 4 Although both claim universal validity, the
concerns of the right override that of the good. The justification for this was that "right"
enjoyed public status, or, put in another way, it was endowed with the function of

2

John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 225 (1985).

3 Id.
4 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 447 (Harvard University Press, 1971).
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reconciling conflicting conceptions of the good so that the good could be realized within
the limits possible in an actual nation-state.
"Toleration" is a name for the virtue that upholds such a public conception of
justice. Toleration is not a private virtue; it is a public virtue which must be nurtured in
order for a democratic society to thrive. Toleration is necessary for "a workable
conception of political justice" 5 to subsist. It is obvious that, for Rawls, this element of
public morality, though intangible, constitutes the most important condition for a "modem
democracy," or "liberal democracy," in our terminology.
We may agree with Rawls thus far. However, as I hope to show below, there exists
a lacuna in his discourse that needs to be filled. Let us discuss conditions (4) unification
as a nation, (5) diversity of conceptions of the good, and (6) a public conception of justice
in this context.
B. Unification as a Nation
It is not a coincidence that absolute monarchies, once they succeed in unifying a
group of people, a territory, and a political power into a nation, are eventually superseded
by popular sovereignty in one form or another. A society unified into a nation, fortified
by a belief in common ethnicity, through its internal systems of interaction, forms an
identity of its own which would not necessarily perceive the monarch as an essential part
of itself.
How, then, would a nation keep itself together? What principles of social cohesion
would be in the interest of popular sovereignty, but not so for other forms of rule?
C. Diverse Conceptions of the Good
If each conception of the good claims universal validity, how can such incommensurable claims coexist peacefully in society? Compromise and arbitration are necessary
but never sufficient. What is also necessary is the fierce and relentless competition of
these conceptions. That is, there must be an arrangement for competition, a fair and
worthwhile race deciding which currents in society may have their conception of the good
prevail for the moment. This does not mean that violence and other methods alien to
rational debate and discourse are tolerated. The contestants must abide by the rules of
rational and free discourse.
Toleration in the political sense, as we saw above, is toleration of fierce
competition for legitimacy within the state. As will be discussed shortly, only democracies, or to be exact, only states that enjoy popular sovereignty, are fit for toleration in this
sense. This is because it is only in the interest of a popular sovereignty that a fierce but
peaceful competition for power should exist. Other forms of sovereignty have as their
primary mandate that they remain in power; whereas, in a popular sovereignty, those who
possess political power hold only the governmental powers entrusted to them by the
sovereign people, whose interest it is to have the very best individuals in office.
Competition is the most effective way to come up with the best leaders; the fiercer the
competition, the better the results. Therefore, toleration is not only a condition but also
an element of democracy.

'
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D. The Public Conception of Justice
The essential political morality that allows a nation-state system to exist must
give direction to norms governing the new relationship between the government and
the governed, as well as that between the citizens as members of a public decisionmaking system. It consists of two fundamental concepts, which are structured to
accommodate each other - the concepts of justice and the good. Justice in a
democratic society is an essential element of the social system; it is the one concept
that can coordinate and override conceptions of the good, the existence of which is
the hallmark of a free society. The proponents of conceptions of the good, claiming
the universal application of their conceptions, cannot by themselves come to the
negotiating table unless there is a mutual interest in doing so. This common interest
is easy for the parties to recognize; it coincides with the private interest of
maintaining the stability of a free society.
In conflicts of value systems and ways of life, there is often little room for
compromise. The conflicts tend to be wars of the gods, of never-ending strife, characteristic of the human condition. It is only when we become sober and humane, when we find
ourselves back in our own size, that we tend to acknowledge the mutual interest in
upkeeping this regime of free choice.
For an efficient system that actually enhances freedom of deliberation, contemplation, and the choice of the good without bursting into a war among gods, a division of
matters into those issues that need to be decided publicly and those that we are free to
decide on our own is essential. The former category comprises the jurisdiction of the
political morality of justice, the latter that of the good. It is only when we acknowledge
such a two-tier system of political morality that a liberal democratic society can exist.
Only then may we answer affirmatively the fundamental question of whether a free
society is possible.
A citizen who can conceptualize the framework of political morality in such a way
that she is willing to yield to the demands of justice for the sake of freedom possesses the
virtue that Rawls calls "toleration." This calls for restraint, but, less conspicuously, it also
calls for participation. Toleration calls for the restraint from asserting one's conception
of the good as being a part of the conception of social justice. Toleration also calls for
active participation in the interpretation of the concept of social justice. As a citizen, a
person should be interested in matters requiring public decision-making: in the United
States, abortion and domestic economic policy are examples. However, this does not mean
a person should be morally reprehended for not having an interest in the current topics
of a political and legal nature. One is free to spend her time and energy as she sees fit.
Because the options of political deliberation and participation are open to the individual
citizen in a democracy, the consequences of non-activism in this sphere fall squarely on
her shoulders.
If an attitude of distinguishing between matters of social justice and the good
is not developed, the usual result is continuous political strife from competing
groups attempting to enforce their conception of the good as the correct conception
of justice and to mandate a certain way of life in society. In societies where the
concepts of justice and the good are not distinguished, liberal democracy does not
exist. The conception of democracy advocated here demands that the parties tolerate
the existence, hence, the coming into power, of proponents of conceptions of the
good inimical to them. This toleration will exist as long as the procedure of coming
into power was legitimate, meaning that it followed the arrangement chosen, in
theory, by all the members of society, and that other parties, including themselves,
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elements of
have the chance of coming into power through this process. These
6
inclusion and competition are the essential elements of democracy.
Toleration is toleration of public competition; it is the toleration of the concept of
justice as being primordial. It is brought about, as Robert Dahl would put it, when there
is consensus that the costs of oppression exceed that of toleration, or, in terms more in
concert with the present discourse, when a shared conception of justice rather than a
monopolizing conception of the good is recognized as the regulative principle and
authority for life in society.7
Toleration is granted to all, but only if they abide by the rules of this competition.
Serious as it is, it is, in a sense, a game when compared to those types of polity that do
not presuppose a peaceful change of government. It is a game in the sense of game theory
as well: it must be more costly to achieve political power through the abdication of the
game itself rather than by playing the game. In other words, those in competition must
find it more rational to say "right precedes good" rather than "my good should be the
right."
This is giving a public choice-type reason for the conditional phrase attached to the
term "the good" in Rawls' quotation: "conceptions of the good affirmed by the members
of existing democratic societies."' Not all conceptions of the good are tolerated, but only
those recognized as being within the ambit of conceptions that can be chosen by
"members of existing democratic societies." For those with conceptions that have little
chance of being so chosen, it would of course be much less costly to simply do away with
the game than to play by the rules. Hence, it would be quite rational for such parties to
choose to overthrow the democratic system of government - a choice that is intolerable
to those playing the game. Toleration, then, is a toleration with bounds.
Who, then, or what defines the bounds? Who enumerates the rules of the game?
Who officially interprets a rule when it is contested? The short answer to the three
questions is: the system of law and justice. A slightly more informative answer would be,
in order of the issues: the sovereign people, and the sovereign will of the people as
expressed in their constitution; in a representative democracy, the representatives of the
people; and the courts given the power of judicial review.
E. The Growth of ConstitutionalGovernment
This last point connects the argument to the second of Rawls' conditions, the
existence of a constitutional government. Sovereignty in a democratic state means more
than just having the political legitimacy and power to rule in a society. If it meant no
more, the difference between a democracy and an oligarchy or monarchy would be no
more than the absolute number of people with political authority. In democracies,
sovereignty also means having the authority to set the rules of competition for entitlement
to govern. That is why a democracy needs to be a "constitutional" government. Whereas
a monarchy was typically considered to be a legitimate form of government through
God's will, not human consensus, a constitution, written or unwritten, establishes the rules

6

See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY 8 (1971). Dahl calls societies which meet the conditions of

popularization and liberalization (in the sense of public contestation) a "polyarchy," because a full-fledged
democracy may have to meet more requirements. In this paper, I would like to explore the conditions
concerning political morality and other normative matters that allow for the existence of a democracy.
However, because I am not claiming a complete enumeration of the conditions for a democracy, use of the
word "democracy" in the sense of polyarchy will suffice for my arguments.
7 Id.
8 Rawls, supra note 2.
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for the legitimacy of government. A constitutional monarchy is therefore in substance a
democracy, not a monarchy.
Sovereignty means further that the power of government is limited so that it would
be legitimate only if organized and exercised in accordance with the basic rules of a
popular government. In large-scale democracies, where non-representative, direct
democracy is not possible given the present level of technology in telecommunications,
the government is entrusted only to those who would abide by such rules.9 This applies
to all the branches of government.
The short answer of "the system of law and justice" can be correct because a
popular sovereignty that has chosen liberal democracy may be defined as a community
where justice has become the basic public value and the laws of the nation ensure the
realization of this value. At the least, such a nation tries its best to deter injustice, and,
failing this, tries to reinstate the equilibrium. It will not allow conceptions of the good to
govern the interpretation of justice: it will have a legal and political mode of thought
especially for this process. This is thinking in terms of rights. Further, it will not allow
certain conceptions of justice to govern the individual's interpretation of the good: as a
rule, infringement of privacy and individual rights in the name of the common good, or
even the commonwealth, will not be tolerated. This is a community where justice is
sought in public decisions, including the decision as to what should belong in the realm
of privacy. It is a community where those who interpret the law are called "justices" for
a good reason - to uphold the right, rather than the good.
The three branches of the government, authorized by the sovereign people and the
rule of law, cooperate to manage a system of justice that coordinates the many different
conceptions of the good in society into a workable social system. In a "constitutional
government," all the branches of government are obligated to abide not only by the letter
but by the spirit of the constitution, be it interpreted as original intent or otherwise. This
platitude obscures an important truth: there is no better public value than justice to guide
the interpretation of the constitution of a nation. The text of a constitution by itself does
not give sense and direction to interpretation of the law: that is why the legal profession
of the United Kingdom, which does not have a written constitution, has no difficulty
interpreting the law in spite of the lack of a written text. It is the conception of justice
embodied in the constitution which gives the feel and tenor for a good interpretation of
the law.
Another point that must be stressed here is that the three branches of government
do not exhaust the official organs of the state. Even in a representative democracy, the
sovereign people have a role not only when they vote, but also in the everyday life of the
society. They are obligated as a state organ to keep up the tradition of interpreting the
concept of justice for society."
The above should suffice as a preliminary explanation of the primacy of justice and
why it makes sense to utilize the concept of justice not only to explain the legitimacy and
structure of a liberal democracy, but also in the context of power politics.

9 In a direct democracy, all the constituents of the polity would need to train themselves to abide by
such rules - another reason why direct democracy is impossible in large-scale societies.
'0 This does not mean each individual citizen has such an obligation. The citizens are obligated as a
whole, not individually. If continuous participation by all is not necessary for keeping up the tradition of
interpretation, not every citizen would need to engage in the activity, and none would need to be active all
the time.

1992]

THE LAWS OF A NATION

F. The Development of Large Market Economies
We come now to the last of the conditions Rawls names, that of the development
of large industrial market economies. What we need to note first is the fact that there
never has been a serious call for democratization, much less a revolutionary attempt for
a liberal democracy, that called for democracy and liberty but did not promise a way out
of economic misery. Although the French Revolution called for "liberty, equality, and
fraternity," it was the cries for bread that culminated in the march to the Bastille and the
revolutionary movement itself. No advocate of democracy has called for perseverance of
poverty in exchange for freedom.
Granted, there were and always will be many whose lot is great poverty in a free
market society. However, there always exists a class or subsection of society that finds
it in its economic interest to democratize. Unless the political power of this stratum is
strong enough to support the transition, democratization will not succeed. In other words,
if the leaders of democracy asked the middle class to endure poverty for the sake of
liberty, a political movement toward democracy would be hard to come by.
Some have asked for death if they could not have liberty. This seemingly flies in
the face of the assertion that economic interest was always a motivating factor toward
democracy. However, we know that such proclamations presuppose the prosperity of the
coming generations, and that the sacrifice of one's life would not be fully redeemed if
freedom was begotten at the price of prosperity.
What are some of the elements necessary to bring about prosperity? History points
to the free market economy. We know what is needed to construct a market economy, but
we do not know how to attain it. That is the problem many of the former socialist
republics now face. The obvious elements are entities described in economic terms:
capital, goods, producers, consumers, market, and, most importantly, the creation of credit.
A less obvious, but just as important, element is a system of rights that makes private
property possible. This entails a system of rules that makes clear which legal person owns
what and stipulates how sales, loans, and other transactions may be consummated. It is
also often remarked that what the former socialist republics seem to lack the most is "the
spirit of capitalism": the respect for the principle that merit and desert should go together,
the respect for innovation, improvisation, and the enterprising spirit.
What we do not know are such things as how in fact markets are formed, what
really goes into a credit-generating structure, and how one builds the spirit of capitalism
inside oneself. The reason we do not really know how to answer these questions is
because, with few exceptions, we have never really faced them before because they were
never asked.' It was not necessary to answer these questions in order to have a market
economy. This is because the social structure and mental attitudes that make up a market
economy are not inventions, but discoveries. They are the products of social evolution.
We did not have to make them, nor did they come into being by design and implementation. The mental element, especially the entrepreneurial outlook, which is simple enough
to grasp but complicated and deep for an Artificial Intelligence scientist, plays a very
large part in such social structures. Many other parts of these social systems are still in
a black box, despite the simplicity of the functional description of the structure.
While social sciences have come great lengths since the days of Adam Smith and
classical economic theory, we cannot yet say without hesitation that, for example, the
"God's invisible hand" aspects of the market have been explained to our satisfaction.

1 The few exceptions being the non-Westem countries that had successfully transformed themselves
into modem nation-states with market economies in the nineteenth century when the West had come to them
to evangelize, trade, and colonize.
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Yes, we have our textbook competitive equilibrium model, but we also know that the
conditions for a perfectly competitive market do not obtain in the real world. Does this
lack of knowledge impair performance in the market? It should not if the market is not
something we have to make; like the skill of riding a bicycle, one does not have to know
the workings of the market mechanism in this sense to do well in the market. Reflecting
on the situation, one finds that not only knowledge of how the market works, but the
concept of knowledge itself, is something we know very little about. However, because
we now face the situation where we must strive to make a market economy, we need to
address these questions of implementation.
What little we do know comes from a field not usually included among the social
sciences, a field many regard as belonging more to art rather than science: the field of
legal studies. Looking at market transactions from the legal point of view, one understands
many aspects of the phenomenon usually abstracted from the social scientific viewpoint.
Those involved in law look at the transaction from the normative point of view, and the
behavior of the agents can be fully described and predicted only from this perspective. In
order to understand the meaning of the social actions taken by the agents in market
transactions, one must understand the basic concepts and precepts of what is sometimes
called private law, in contrast to public law. Further, techniques of administration of the
market, which is the step we need to take to go from a bartering economy to a market
one, can be implemented only by policy measures, which need legal authorization and
legitimacy.
This point makes it very clear that Rawls' concept of the function of law needs
supplementation. As we saw above, the only reference to law Rawls made was in
mentioning the need for a constitutional government. This indirectly refers to the laws of
a nation, with an emphasis on public constitutional law. Neither the variety of laws that
exist nor the importance of private law is emphasized in Rawls' quotation. A judiciary
that can effectively judge matters of private, as well as public, law is a necessary and
often under-emphasized element of liberal democracy.
The market, as pointed out above, is a product of social evolution. It is the product
of certain modes of transaction between individuals that grew from a simple barter system
into trade, not between agents in face-to-face contact, but between those remote in place
and time. This was possible because of the currency of money, the existence of a price
for the product, and an enforcement mechanism for promises to pay or to deliver goods,
which sanctioned the use of credit. For all three of these conditions, the existence of law
regarding trade and market administration and the legal rules and institutions that can
resolve conflicts in this sphere are essential elements of a market economy.
At the base of this is a system of private property that makes it clear who owns
what, and hence, who may sell or lease what. If a citizen of a liberal democracy is an
enterprising person, a secure grounding of her possessions is a primary condition for her
willingness to make whatever she wishes to sell and to produce more efficiently through
innovation. The secure grounding of the possessions of others is a primary condition of
her willingness to buy the necessary capital goods for production and to produce more
efficiently through wise investment.
So far, I have not questioned the thesis that the existence of a market economy is
a necessary condition for the existence of democracy. Is this true? The answer depends
on one's conception of democracy. There have always been two sometimes conflicting
ideals involved in democracy - liberty and equality. 2 If democracy is conceived as a
regime conducive to equality, then democracy and market economy do not go together.
2 While, as I pointed out above, the element of fraternity, or national identity, is also essential, we

may leave this aside for the moment.
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Market economy usually brings about economic inequality as a consequence of efficient
resource allocation. On the other hand, if democracy is conceived primarily as a regime
conducive to freedom of the individual, even at the cost of equality, then the two may go
together. The difference here is brought into our interpretation of liberty.
Compare the conceptions of liberty espoused by the advocates of liberalism against
those espoused by the proponents of libertarianism. Under the liberal conception of
freedom, equality and freedom do not contradict each other; equality is a necessary
condition for freedom. However, under the libertarian conception, there is a trade off
relationship between equality and freedom. In so far as the political conditions for
democracy bring increased participation in the political process, the demand for equality
would also tend to increase. Does this mean the liberal conception of liberty is the only
legitimate choice? Not necessarily. If equality only implies equality of opportunity but not
of outcome, then the libertarian tendency would be the trend.
Historically, democracy and economic growth, through the powers of a market
economy, go hand in hand. In so far as building a social safety net, or a social security
and health care system, requires the modification of pure market principles, chances are
that building such a safety net would slow the rate of growth. The price of outcome
equality in a market economy is a decrease in the rate of growth. Hence, the choice open
to democracies is whether to become more liberal with a corresponding slowdown in
growth, or to become more libertarian with the possibility of greater growth but less
outcome equality.' 3
II.

TRIBALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

The social and historic conditions of modem democracy that Rawls gives, except
that of toleration, are commonplace. We have seen from the above examination that,
although Rawls' conditions may be necessary for democracy, they are not sufficient. One
can certainly add to this list such often cited conditions as a multi-party system, free
press, and civilian control of the military. Howe.'er, the one condition that I have found
to be sorely missing, and will discuss below, is that of the existence of a modem legal
system. I shall now explain in more detail, why and how a modem legal system, with its
particular mode of thought and discourse using the terminology of "rights," is essential
for a liberal democracy. I shall begin with the question: Why is an open and free society
a good thing? I will show that the typical institutional form of a free society is a liberal
democracy. Then, I will attempt to make clear that an essential element of a liberal
democracy is its system of law.
A. What Good is an Open Society?
One cannot say without sarcasm that there is precious little difference between
being a tribesman and being a citizen of a modem state. There are rules one must abide
by in both the tribe and the modem state. However, the rules and the way they work are
so different in the two types of communities that one may regard them as being literally
from two different worlds.
In the typical tribal society, the code of the clan or tribe must be upheld without
questioning the purpose of the rules; changing the rules through mutual discussion and

13

Or so it was thought. The incoming United States Democratic administration seems to promise both

greater growth and a social safety net at the same time: the former, through more spending and trimming
down of individual overhead costs, the latter involving the building of a national health care system.
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resolve is impossible. If there is a conflict, the elders intervene and mediate. Resorting to
the judicial system and arguing the case in a court of law is similarly not an option;
neither the concept of law nor the judicial system necessary for implementing law exists
in this society. A society based on and embodying the rule of law must exist for such a
legal system to function therein. The tribal society as we perceive it is anything but such
a society.
In a tribal society, sanctions against deviant behavior may be cruel and extreme;
family members and relatives may also be punished for one's wrongdoing. There is no
meaningful difference between law and morality; crimes are always sinful, and all sinful
acts and attempts, often even thoughts, are crimes. Further, persons who have engaged in
behavior deemed to be evil by the society are thereby considered sinful and should be
reproached, punished, and despised.
There is no meaningful division between the actions and the personality of a
person. If such a division is ever acknowledged in the tribal society, then the wrongdoer
would be punished for being the person that she is, rather than for her actions. The person
punished is usually seen as belonging to a certain class whose mores she must abide by,
not as a sovereign individual with inherent principles of action of her own. She is
punished for being the sort of person who would break the rules of the tribe. The person
has broken the rules and is thereby sinful.
Even when the norms broken are not the commands and edicts of the ruler,
disobedience is seen as being inherently corrosive of the ongoing order of society, as well
as being morally reprehensible. One obvious function of the rules is to keep the people
from deviating from the social order, usually to the benefit of those in power.
The concept of right is alien to this framework for understanding a person and her
place in society. The purpose of keeping order in a tribal society cannot be that of
upholding the rights of the individual. This society lacks enforceable laws of contract,
torts, commerce, and other laws governing the relationship between private persons; a4
1
criminal law in the modern sense, where nulla poena sine lege, nullum crimen sine lege
is the inviolable rule; and, most prominently, the protections given by a constitutional law
that defines the rights of the citizen. What exists in its stead is what would be best
conceived of as the sacred code of a clan, consisting mainly of norms of obligation
prescribing strict adherence to the standing norms of the society as well as to the
directives of those higher than oneself in the hierarchy.
Only in contrast to such a tribal society can the blessings of a typical liberal and
democratic society be appreciated. What then are the essential ingredients of a liberal and
democratic society? I have gone over some of the elements in the former section. Here,
I want to emphasize the element of law: a free and democratic society can exist in
substance only if the society has a system of law in the modem sense. This means that
the existence of a modern legal system is necessary for the existence of an "open
society," a term I use interchangeably with a "liberal and democratic state." It does not
mean that the existence of such a system by itself signifies that the society is free and
democratic.
Whether it is really impossible for a free society to exist without a modem legal
system depends upon what we conceive a free society and a modem legal system to be.
In order to substantiate the claim that it is indeed impossible, I want first to make clear
what I mean by a "liberal and democratic state" and "a modem legal system," then go
on to explain why a modern legal system is essential to the structure of this type of
society.
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Before we do that, let us answer a question many may have: why not just a
democracy instead of a liberal democracy? Is not democracy enough for a free society?
Also, many may wonder why I am referring to a free society instead of a democracy. Is
not democracy enough for upholding a system of rights to be free? The answer is no.
True, democracy may be interpreted in several distinctly different ways. Democracy may,
as suggested above, mean a form of government, in contrast to monarchy and oligarchy:
the rule of the people, by the people. If taken in this sense, democracy is not enough for
a society to be free. The people of a nation may choose to form and operate a tyrannical
and intolerant government oppressing all rights to be free on the grounds that it would be
in the "true" interests of the people, similar to Rousseau's justification of "coercion to
be free."' 5 There is nothing in this conception of democracy to prevent this.
Democracy may be taken, in another sense, as a political ideology expressing the
political ideal of power residing in the people and the ethical ideal of the free and
independent person. The problem then becomes how a democratic system can guarantee
and uphold such ideals. The political conception of democracy does not by itself contain
such an encompassing power. It needs the political philosophy of what is usually called
liberalism to reinforce this political ideal and to substantiate the ethical ideal.
B. What is a Liberal Democratic State?
The conception of a free or open society put forward here upholds the principle
that each member of the society has an equal right to live according to his or her values,
hence, choice. An open society runs smoothly when the maximum liberty to think,
express, and realize one's idea of a good life is secured and guaranteed. The conception
assumes a person's capacity and desire to think for oneself without being told by others
- however sacred or powerful - how one should organize and live a good life. The
complex activity of thinking, planning, and living out a life that one may truly call one's
own is the basic right and responsibility of a citizen of an open society.
A society that upholds the right and responsibility to be free in this sense and
whose government values and protects freedom is a free society. A person may not be
free even though she may feel that she is; she must have rights that are enforced by the
government and respected by its citizens that would allow her to decide and act on her
own, even when her decision may not be favored by the majority. Having a right is the
legal expression of being free, and freedom that does not enjoy legal protection is not
bona fide freedom.
The greatest virtue and appeal of the modern state is its capability to realize and
secure a social system which upholds such a system of rights. I shall therefore examine
the modem state from this point of view. This should bring out aspects of the modern
state that are not customarily stressed, and, if successful, should provide a positive outlook
on the modern state. I shall denote a modern state that does have the characteristics I
enumerate as a "liberal democratic state" or a "free state" for short.
A free state is an association of members of a society that enables the existence
and development of freedom in that society. The association consists of distinctive
political, social, and economic systems which have, besides their proper functions of
maintaining governmental, communal, and economic order, the ultimate function of
upholding a free society. The association has a political system that both authorizes and

" The idea that in order to be truly enlightened of one's own best interest, voluntary education alone
may not always be enough; the use of coercion to learn might be justified. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,

Du

CONTRACT SOCIAL, OU PRINCIPES DU DROIT POLITIQUE [THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL RIGHT] (C.M. Sherover trans., New American Library, 1974) (1762).
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limits the power of the government to acquire and maintain public goods, including the
services of the judicial system and the market mechanism. The role of the government is
constrained by the ideal of popular sovereignty; the government exists only to serve the
people.
A free state has a social system that materializes the freedom, heritage, and security
necessary for individual moral development. It also has a market economy that frees the
government from the fruitless and often detrimental task of distributing resources
efficiently.
Contrary to other existing models of the state, the government of the free state
depicted here does not monopolize the public mandate. The public agents of a free state
are constituted not only of the government institutions but also of the agents in the free
market as well as the individual in her capacity as a citizen or as an agent in an informal
public decision-making process. The free state is comprised of public decision-making
systems usually designated as government, market, and the formal and informal popular
decision-making processes. The market, though not intentionally, but knowingly, 6 makes
public decisions concerning the allocation of resources. While no one knows what the
consequences of the accumulated microdecisions are at a given time, everyone knows that
as long as the market is not failing, the allocation pattern will turn out to be more or less
closer to Pareto-optimal 7 than when compared with, say, a centralized economy. It is
not an intentional public decision, but it is a public decision nevertheless; the decision
affects the whole of the community and is sanctioned by state law and power in case of
non-compliance.
The free state is so constituted that the right of an individual to be free can be
exercised to the greatest degree possible without infringing the equal right of others to do
the same. The free state is constantly being molded and developed in such a way that
upholding, clarifying, and advancing the respect for this right may be seen as the purpose
for the state's existence.
Citizens of a liberal democratic state have the right to disobey any edict in the
form of law which does not serve the state's purpose of safeguarding this fundamental
right of the citizen. The basic right of the citizen to disobey a particular edict of the state,
then, is based on the citizen's right to challenge the state when she believes it has stepped
beyond its legitimate powers. The citizen would, of course, be at risk of being wrong in
her decision, with the final say on the legality of her actions determined by the courts.
C. What Constitutes a Modern Legal System?
The social institution that is most fit for protecting the rights of its citizens is the
modern legal system, such as that of the United States or Western Europe. The
governments of these states have in common an independent judiciary, as well as a
legislative and an executive branch. The term "legal system" in these states is often taken
to denote the judiciary and policing systems. I would like to stipulate a different definition
that clarifies the relation of law to freedom in a society. I would like to call a "legal
system" all subsystems of a state that are authorized and restricted under the rule of law.
This would include not only the judiciary and its implementing organs, but also the
legislative and the executive branches as well as the citizen as a political organ. In

6

See JOHN L. AUSTIN, Three Ways of Spilling Ink, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (J.O. Urmson & G.J.

Wamock eds., 3d ed. 1979).
'7
An allocation of resources that cannot be made better in terms of social utility without making the
welfare of any single individual in the society worse off.
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addition, the legal system in this sense comprises all systems of public decision-making
that refer to the law in their procedures and transactions.
Such legal systems have not been built from design; rather, they were the products
of what one might call social evolution. However, once the distinct form of a legal system
had been developed, it was to some extent possible to build on it or even export it and
modify it to implement such a system of liberty by design. The resulting form is the
modem liberal democratic nation-state.
D. Is Liberal Democracy Perfect?
I have contended that a liberal democratic state is a state with a modem legal
system that upholds the rights, hence freedom, of its citizens. Can there be a free state
without law? Hardly. The rights of a person cannot be defined and protected without a
modem legal system. Then, is any society with law a free state? Hardly. There are
conceptions of law, especially those that originated in the Orient, that are alien to the
concept of rights. Here, the law is the command of the sovereign, or Emperor. The
purpose of law enforcement is not to uphold the rights of the citizen, but to uphold the
social order and the command of the sovereign. Whole civilizations have flourished under
such tribal principles of social cohesion. The free state is to be distinguished from these:
it is an open society with a modem legal system where the purpose of law is to protect
the rights of its 'citizens to plan and realize a good life for themselves.
Is the free state then perfect? We are still much too ignorant to be in a position to
answer this question. One issue - the identity and fraternity of the people of a nation has yet to be squarely faced by the proponents of a free state. For people to live happy
lives, not only do the rights of the individual need to be fully protected, but the identity
and self-respect of the individual as a member of her society must be fully established.
Thinking solely in terms of rights, that is, regarding social interaction as essentially an
exercise in the transaction of rights, may well enhance the protection of rights in the short
run. However, we do not yet know whether such an attitude would affect one's national
identity, or identity as a member of a nation, in a positive manner. Participation in politics
through the public decision-making process is especially important, not only for the
straightforward political purpose it serves, but also as an avenue of self-expression of the
national identity of the person. The social value of fraternity, as well as liberty and
equality, must be given due weight. We do not yet know whether a suitably interpreted
version of a free state could take on this issue.
There are basically two ways of approaching the problem. One is to define national
identity solely in terms of the state apparatus and to eschew any and all references to
ethnicity, religion, and other traits and creeds that cannot claim universality at the national
level. This is the path that the United States of America has seemingly taken: its citizens
pledge their allegiance to their flag and to those symbols and institutions that belong to
the nation as a whole. The other path is to define national identity not only in terms of
the state apparatus, but also in terms of some of those traits and creeds that the majority
of the nation share and regard as part of the national identity. This is the path that the
Western European states took in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the nationstate first became a historical reality. France is the country of the French. Germany is the
land of the German Volk.
The concept of the nation-state itself is ambiguous on this point. Officially
and theoretically, the former definition probably would be dominant. However, in
actual practice, the latter definition seems to have the upper hand. Just looking at
a coin in America would suggest this. The term "God" in "In God we trust"
certainly is not usually interpreted as the God worshiped by, say, the Muslims.
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Americans often discuss the possibility of a black president in the future. This
presupposes that such a possibility is very small in the present, suggesting that the
presidency is not open to all racial and ethnic groups to an equal degree. If this is
the case even in America, it is very difficult to refute the thesis that all societies are
tribal in some ways.
We do not yet know if this is a condition we must overcome in order to
realize a free state in its pure form. It may well be that this phenomenon is due to
an inherent imperfection in the concept of a free state: the demands for a stable
social cohesion cannot be based solely upon mutual trust and respect. The
communitarians have accused the liberals of espousing this type of political
philosophy, and the debate is still on.
E. The Legal System Must Fit the PoliticalSystem
What must be stressed in this context is the fact that the legal system is only
one subsystem among others in a nation-state. There are certain types of political
grievances that make it quite clear that the problems that the legal system can solve
constitute only a portion of the manifold political issues that must be addressed for
an open society to be a happy one. The recent Rodney King affair is a case in
point.' 8 This was a case where criminal procedures could not accommodate the
consensus on the political morality of police behavior. When the legal system does
not accommodate the demands of society, one must find a different social
mechanism that could give expression to public sentiment. In Japan and most nations
with a long history, social norms and structures usually have developed which cater
to this type of dissatisfaction, with the effect of venting steam. These structures can
be regarded as both a merit and a demerit for the entire system. On one hand, it
stabilizes and satisfies, while on the other, it gives extra years to a corrupt regime
and undermines the development of a legal system.
A great contrast to this is America, a nation that loves the law. Befitting for a
nation of the New World, it has so far tried, when it could, to squarely face such divisive
issues by revising the legal procedures to accommodate them. Such has not been the case
in the greater part of the world.
One reason the power and swirl of the winds of democracy seem now to bring
about more destruction than construction may be this difference in attitude and
tradition. A nation in its stage of metamorphosis towards democracy and market
economy needs a modern legal system, including personnel who can competently run
the system. Only then would a nation be able to experience change on a larger scale,
the gradual social change in attitude toward standing social norms and the rising
institution of modern law. Without it, the winds of change can easily develop into
an uncontrollable tornado.

'8 Rodney King was a black motorist who was physically assaulted by members of the mostly white
Los Angeles police department. The incident of brutality was captured on film by a Los Angeles resident
and shown on national television. Public outrage brought the most culpable officers to trial. Venue for the
trial was transferred from the largely minority Los Angeles to the white suburb of Simi Valley. There, an
all-white jury acquitted the defendants.
Immediately upon release of the verdict, members of the Los Angeles community erupted into several
days of riots, looting stores, and burning buildings. The national guard was called in to restore order.
Sensing a powder keg of racial tension, the federal government has chosen to retry the police officers under
several civil rights statutes.
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III.

FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND AFFLUENCE IN JAPAN

A. An Outline of the Modernization of Japan
Japan began its process of becoming a full-fledged liberal democratic nation-state
in the middle of the nineteenth century when the Western powers appeared with a fleet
of battleships "proposing" an opening of trade relations. Though problems with logistics
made it impossible for the British and, later, the Americans to wage war, it was a
sufficient demonstration of military might to coax the then ruling government to open the
doors of Japan to trade. The turn of events also added great impetus to the movement to
Westernize and modernize Japan. At that time, both the ruling government and the
political forces soon to establish the Meiji government believed that Japan. had to attain
sufficient military strength in order to fend off a Western military invasion and to avoid
being pressured into agreeing to pacts and treaties that were against its national interests.
The leaders also decided that the modernization of the government and the construction
of modern industries were urgently necessary for the purpose of accumulating the wealth
of the nation, if only to keep a relatively competitive position in trade talks and other
negotiations.
As far as this initial incident was concerned, the Japanese government was taken
by surprise and forced into agreeing to an inequitable trade treaty with America and the
major Western European nations. The latter half of the nineteenth century and the
beginning decade of the twentieth century was, for Japan, a period of repeated and often
degrading negotiations to rectify the inequitable treaties. In order to be taken seriously and
to sit at the negotiating table, Japan had to attain wealth and military power, implement
a Western type of legal and political system, and profess respect for human rights.
Otherwise, the treaties would have remained inequitable. Needless to say, with one false
move, such as failing to counter a maneuver by one of the factions ambitious for domestic
power in conspiracy with a foreign power, the fate of its neighboring Asian countries
would have been assigned to Japan - colonization by the imperialist powers.
Of the many inequities in the treaties, the greatest issue for the Japanese
government was the right of the foreign powers to try their own citizens for crimes
committed in Japan. The justification for this arrangement was that since Japan did not
have modern criminal laws and a modern legal system with an independent judiciary, it
could not be trusted to try the defendant in a civilized manner respectful of the rights of
the accused. In practice, those foreigners that committed atrocities such as murder, rape,
and other brutal crimes were acquitted or sent back to their countries of origin to be set
free. It was not until 1894, forty years after the first treaty, that Japan was finally able to
do away with this clause. It took until 1911, another seventeen years, to negotiate Japan's
independent right to place levies on its imports.
It was under such circumstances that Japan had to modernize its laws and
transform itself into a modern nation-state. 9 Obviously, neither the general welfare of
its citizens nor their opinions were the primary concern of the Japanese government in
modernizing its legal system and other institutions of the state. From this perspective, the
'9 There were some comical episodes in the process of Westernization. The politicians, high officials,
and their wives were encouraged to wear Western clothes and learn ballroom dancing; diplomatic balls were
held continuously, just so that the foreign diplomats in Japan would feel that Japan was becoming
"civilized."
There were also more tragic methods that Japan believed it had to use to prove itself. Japan waged wars
against countries many times its size to demonstrate its military power and the nation's determination to
become a full-fledged nation-state. The war against China in 1894 and the war against Russia in 1904 were
of this type.
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high officials in government were seriously contemplating the drafting of a constitution,
the mainstay of a respectable government under law.
However, at the same time, those not involved in the government but who were
fervent believers in the rights of man formed groups in the most remote places in Japan,
and, one after another, proposed their own versions of the Japanese constitution, crying
loudly both in press and in person for "freedom and civil rights." These grass-root
democrats came up with the most radical drafts, proclaiming that Japan should become
a republic and abdicate imperial rule.2"
Thus, those in power in Japan had the dual objective of appeasing the Western
powers and placating the domestic democratic movement by drafting a constitution. It
came in 1889, based on the Prussian model with the Tenno, or Emperor, in place of the
Kaiser.2' The Meiji Constitution, as it is now called, of course, did not please the
democrats, but the government divided and suppressed them into reluctant recognition of
the Constitution. The same Constitution was found to be acceptable by the foreign powers,
which forfeited the immunity of their citizens five years later.
The world of the latter half of the nineteenth century is known as the age of
imperialism. A full-fledged nation-state found itself pressured to assume an imperialist
foreign policy for its own survival. Unless a nation-state itself was large enough to have
a domestic market comparable to the world market of, say, the British Empire, a nation
desiring to be an independent state had very little choice but to round up a dominion of
its own. For Japan, the choice was a bleak one: it was either to become a colony of one
of these powers or to become an imperialist state itself.
The imperialist international order had the most unhappy consequences not
only for those outside these imperialist countries, but also for those involved in the
domestic political movements towards democracy and liberalism within them. It was
especially so for the "late comer" nations such as Germany and Japan. The Weimar
Republic was one of the most liberal nations that mankind knew, and we know what
happened to it.
In Asia, although obliterated from Western history books through the war effort,
Japan had a similarly liberal democratic period from the second decade of this century
into the mid-twenties, known as the era of "Taisho Democracy." At that time, Japan was
finally recognized as an equal trading partner by the Western powers and had the fortune
of siding with the victors during World War I. The nation attained self-respect, wealth,
and a viable constitutional government with a great many politically enthusiastic,
democratic citizens. The arts, literature, and cinema thrived. Additionally, during this
period, Japan realized many of the other fruits of a liberal democracy, especially a
competitive economy.
Of course, the darker side of the same movement was gathering momentum at the
same time. Because of the form of the initial impetus towards modernization, strong
military power was always an imperative in pre-war Japan. Also, if free enterprise allows
the rich to become wealthier and forces the indigent to become poorer, it is not unnatural
for those hungry and suffering to long for justice and a master solution to their troubles.
The Emperor in Japan was the perfect embodiment of their perceived savior. The rest is
history, which I shall not go into.

20 The thoughts of these individuals were greatly influenced by the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau,

John Stuart Mill, and others. Mill's works in political theory were translated into Japanese only a few years
after their initial publication in England.
2 This, incidently, was the year Britain colonized South Rhodesia and the works of Frederic William
Maitland and Albert Venn Dicey were translated into Japanese.
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B. Japan, the Land of the Middle Class
It is well known that after World War II, Japan, like Germany, successfully
transformed itself into a liberal democracy. The constitution adopted in post-war Japan
is marked by significant change from the pre-war constitution. The Emperor is deprived
of all substantial political power. The cabinet now answers to the people rather than to the
Emperor. The use of force has been foresworn as a method for resolving international
conflict.22 In spite of such fundamental changes in its constitution, Japan's drive toward
becoming an independent, respectable nation-state was fueled by essentially the same
forces that first gave it the initiative to modernize. Hence, the element of law and respect
for the rights of its citizens never really came to the foreground.
Many now consider the democratization of Japan, despite its affluence in terms of
gross national product and gross domestic product, to be deeply problematic. Because of
the historical circumstances that brought about a political tradition wanting in respect for
modern law and the rights of the citizens, the citizens in turn fostered an attitude wanting
in respect for politics and the sense of citizenship. As a result, the democratic process in
Japan often lacks popular support. This has caused corruption to be structured into the
political process.23
On the other hand, Japan has been remarkably successful in the redistribution of
income: about eighty-five percent of the population believe they belong to the middle
class. In any free state, the middle class is the mainstay of a liberal democracy. In Japan,
what is needed is a more responsible middle class, who would spend a portion of its
income to support the party of its choice. Instead, the mass media chide and criticize the
politicians for their lack of moral integrity, to which the television viewer and the
newspaper reader passively nod in agreement.
There is amazing passivity in the Japanese citizen's attitude toward politics. A
portion of the taxes paid by such Japanese citizens will help finance the reconstruction of
the national economy and the construction of democratic political processes in the former
socialist republics and the developing nations.2 4 More Japanese citizens should become
aware of how these funds are being used, but while very few are interested, still fewer
would try to do anything about it. This is just one example of the Japanese citizens'
attitude toward politics. There should be more "civilian" control over the public decisionmaking process in Japan, which more and more affects the state of the world.
In Japan, toleration is not an issue; there is too much of it. Or, to be precise, there
is too much of what passes off for toleration: namely, apathy towards politics. Political
apathy and lack of dependence on the rule of law is the mark of a modest and ineffectual
empire of law. If this is one side of the coin, the other side manifests itself in the
subsistence of a powerful realm of the rule of social, non-legal norms and the tribal
mentality supporting the regime. What needs to be done? The restraining of the tribal
mentality, whether the object of allegiance is the family or the firm, and the boosting of
the citizenship mindset in its stead. However, many who have opted for the latter have
found themselves abandoned by the courts. Hence, an initiative for a stronger and more

22 Many, especially the liberals in Japan, thought this to be wonderful progress, finally breaking off
from that idiefixe that an independent nation must have military as well as political and economic power.
23 For instance, because the most influential political parties have not settled in deeply enough into the

community to be able to ask for donations to cover the costs of the very expensive elections, policiticians
have often no choice but to accept funds from dubious sources. In the case of the Liberal Democratic Party,
where the leaders of the factions do provide funds to its members, the leaders themselves must look for
funding outside the party system. The economic community, especially the up-and-coming enterprises, often
respond to this need in exchange for influence, sometimes favors, resulting in large-scale corruption.
24 Japan is now the world's largest donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA).
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rights-conscious judiciary may be a good place to start for a new phase of democratization
of Japan. But, this again needs popular support.
IV. CONCLUSION

Yes, the winds of change are swirling across the globe, and, as inhabitants of this
planet at this moment in history, we may feel that we are all on the way, if rocky, to an
open society. However, even if there is truth in this perception, I do not feel that we are
at the end of history; the problems connected with ethnic and racial identity loom too
large for any sort of optimism. In fact, I feel that we are now evolving into a new stage
in history, that we are in the midst of a process where the very concept of a nation-state
and the rules of behavior based upon the concept are undergoing change. If, as I had
contended, a society needs a modem system of law to become an open society, insofar
as a modem legal system presupposes a nation-state as the political framework in which
it exists, this process involves the development of a new conception of an open society.
Whatever this new conception turns out to be, an essential ingredient in the making
of a free and open society will be an attitude by the peoples of this planet which is an
extension of the spirit of toleration. It must be a moral attitude which will allow peoples
to help those in need in some aspects, while being helped in turn in different aspects;
none purely the benefactor, none purely the beneficiary. Whether the political morality of
liberal democracy has the capability to nurture peoples who can see the relationship
between themselves and others in this way, peoples both proud and humble of being who
they are, is yet to be seen. We, as members of this global society, should strive to bring
out the best in liberal democracy and see if it is indeed possible. We should at the same
time be searching for any new concept of a free political community which may
supercede that of liberal democracy.

